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Abstract
Lewis’s Principal Principle is widely recognized as a rationality constraint that
our credences should satisfy throughout our epistemic life. In practice, however,
our credences often fail to satisfy this principle because of our various epistemic
limitations. Facing such violations, we should correct our credences in accor-
dance with this principle. In this paper, I will formulate a way of correcting our
credences, which will be called the Adams Correcting Rules and then show that
such a rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing and correcting.
With the help of the notion of ‘accuracy’, then, I attempt to provide a vindica-
tion of the Adams Correcting Rule and show how we can respond to the non-
commutativity in question.
͟ Introduction
Many philosophers of probability think that there are some epistemic norms govern-
ing how objective chances ought to be related to our credences. The most famous
chance-credence norm is what is called the Principal Principle, which is formulated
and named by David Lewis (ͧͦ͟͞). This principle and its variants are widely rec-
ognized as a rationality constraint that our credences should satisfy throughout our
epistemic life.
In practice, however, our credences often fail to satisfy this principle because of
our various epistemic limitations. For example, some may have no idea what chance
∗This paper is forthcoming in Synthese.
†Chonbuk National University, Jeonju, Republic of Korea; Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Republic of
Korea
͟
functions are possible, some may have no idea how chance functions should be re-
ϐlected in their credences, and so forth. Of course, if the Principal Principle is a ratio-
nality constraint and such agents happen to know this, then they should correct their
credences in accordance with the principle. Then, is there any way of correcting our
credences? Is such a way, if any, helpful in achieving our epistemic goal?
In order tomake the point clear, let me consider an agent who, at a given time, has
no idea about the objective chances and their relationship to her credences, and so
violates the Principal Principle. After a while, she ϐinds that the principle is an epis-
temic norm that she should satisfy, and then thinks through a way of correcting her
credences in accordance with the principle. Meanwhile, she also happens to know
that she will receive several pieces of evidence sometime later. (However, she does
not know exactly what evidence she will receive.) The agent, who is placed in this
doxastic situation, deliberates how to correct her credenceswhen she receives the ev-
idence. In this regard, we can consider two possible ways of correcting her credences
in accordance with the Principal Principle. The ϐirst is to correct the credences after
adjusting them according to the evidence; the second is to adjust the credences ac-
cording to the evidence after correcting them. If these two kinds of correction make
no difference in her ϐinal credences, then there will be no reason to prefer one to the
other, and so either of the two may be good to her. Even if her new credences vary
according to how she corrects, we do not have to consider the difference seriously if
they are all expected to succeed in achieving the epistemic goal.
As will be shown, however, the agent’s new credencesmay be different depending
on which of the two ways of correction she adopts. Moreover, it will also be argued
in what follows that there is an epistemic reason to prefer one way to the other. At
ϐirst glance, we might say, “For a credence function to respect properly the evidence,
the credence function should be rational in advance. So, if the Principal Principle is
a requirement of rationality, then the agent should plan to adjust the credences ac-
cording to the evidence after correcting them.” However, considering an epistemic
value, i.e., accuracy, of our credences, we will arrive at the opposite conclusion—that
is, the agent should plan to correct the credences after adjusting them according to
the evidence.͟
͟A caveat needs to be stated from the start. This paper concerns ways of correcting our credences.
Someone may think that this kind of correction leads us to be committed to doxastic voluntarism. In-
deed, readers can ϐind several voluntaristic expressions like ‘adopt the credence’ in this paper. How-
ever, this paper is not committed to such voluntarism. My argument in this paper may be regarded as
criticizing or evaluating, rather than blaming, agents whose credences evolve in violation of the rele-
͠
This paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I will give some prelimi-
nary notes about chances and credences. In Section ͡, I will formulate a Bayesian rule
of correcting our credences, whichwill be called the Adams Correcting Rule, and then
show in Section ͢ that such a rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing
and correcting. Section ͣ will be devoted to vindicating, with the help of the notion
‘accuracy’, the Adams Correcting Rule. In a similar way, it will also be argued in that
section that an agent, who faces a decision problem due to the non-commutativity in
question, should plan tomake a correction after adjusting our credences according to
evidence.
͠ Stage Setting
Before I proceed further, some notes about assumptions, terminology, and notations
are in order. First, I assume that credences and chances are all probabilities. That
is, credence and chance functions are assumed to satisfy the standard probability ax-
ioms. It is also assumed that those credence and chance functions are deϐined on the
same outcome space 𝒲, which is a set of possible worlds. For the sake of mathe-
matical simplicity, it will be assumed that𝒲 has only ϐinitely many possible worlds.
Propositions in this paper are deϐined as a subset of𝒲.͠
In this paper, I will discuss several kinds of credence functions that are placed in
various evidential situations. Some have no empirical evidence, others have several
pieces of evidence. The credence functions, which have no empirical evidence what-
soever, can be regarded as ones that agents have at the beginning of their credal life.
In this sense, I will call them the ‘initial credence functions’. The agent who has such
a credence function is often called a ‘superbaby’. (See, for example, Hájek (͟͠͞͠) and
Pettigrew (ͤ͟͠͞b).) Superbabies are rational, and so, by deϐinition, satisfy all the ra-
tionality constraints.
Iwill also assume that the credence functions that have evidence are updated from
the initial credence functions by means of Conditionalization on the evidence. That
is, it is assumed that if an agent with credence function 𝐶 receives total evidence 𝐸,
vant epistemic norms. I should thank to Alan Hájek and Jaemin Jung for helping me make this point
clear.
͠The unit set {𝑤} is a proposition, but I will use interchangeably ‘{𝑤}’ and 𝑤 if there is no danger
of confusion. When𝐴 is a proposition, ‘¬𝐴’ refers to the complement of𝐴with respect to𝒲—namely,
the negation of𝐴. Similarly, when𝐴 and𝐵 are propositions, the conjunction ‘𝐴𝐵’ and the disjunction
‘𝐴 ∨ 𝐵’, respectively, refer to the intersection and union of𝐴 and𝐵.
͡
then it holds that:
Conditionalization. For any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲, 𝐶𝐸(𝐴) = 𝐶(𝐴|𝐸)where 𝐶(𝐸) > 0.
Here, 𝐶𝐸 refers to the agent’s credence function that has total evidence 𝐸. In what
follows, I will divide credence functions into two different types—Chance-free and
Chance-fed credence functions. Roughly speaking, the former is the credence func-
tion that reϐlects no impact of chances on the credal system and so may violate the
Principal Principle, while the latter is the function that does reϐlect such impact in
accordance with the principle. Then, the correction that will be discussed in this pa-
per may be regarded as a kind of updating from a chance-free credence function to a
chance-fed one.
In this paper, I will followmany theorists in assuming that the Principal Principle
is a rationality constraint and do so without any arguments for such rationality of the
principle.͡ In order to formulate this principle, we need to introduce some additional
assumptions and notations. First of all, I assume that each possible world has only
one ur-chance function. Here, ‘an ur-chance function at a particular world’ refers to
a chance function that does not reϐlect any history of that world. I will not rule out
the metaphysical possibility that two different worlds have the same ur-chance func-
tion. As assumed, there are only ϐinitely many possible worlds. Thus, there are only
ϐinitely many ur-chance functions. Following Hall (͢͠͞͞) and Pettigrew (͟͢͠͞), I will
formulate the Principal Principle bymeans of ur-chance functions.͢ ‘𝑈𝑖’ stands for the
proposition that 𝑐ℎ𝑖 is the ur-chance function. This kind of proposition will be called
‘an ur-chance proposition’. 𝑈𝑖 is true at all and only possible worlds whose ur-chance
function is 𝑐ℎ𝑖. Thus, 𝑈𝑖 is equivalent to the disjunction of all possible worlds whose
ur-chance function is 𝑐ℎ𝑖. It is noteworthy that the set of 𝑈𝑖s is a partition, which will
be denoted by ‘𝒰’.
͡Indeed, theremay bemany philosophical debates onwhat it is for an epistemic principle or rule to
be a requirement of rationality. However, as the purpose of this paper is concerned, it is not necessary
to discuss such a problem. Rather, Iwill assume that there are some reasons that the Principal Principle
should be regarded as a requirement of rationality, and such reasons do not undermine my discussion
that follows. A similar assumption goes with other principles appearing in this paper. In what follows,
I will formulate a decision-theoretic principle that is related to credence correction. See Sections ͣ.͠
and ͣ.͡. Regarding such a principle, I assume a similar thing to the rationality of the Principal Principle.
I should thank an anonymous referee for making this point clear.
͢Someone may think that this formulation cannot be applied to the world that has no beginning—
an inϐinite past. I agree. However, this feature has little to do with the discussion that follows. Indeed,
if there is any proposition characterizing chance functions that one should respect, thenmy discussion
will go through.
͢
With these assumptions and notations in hand, we can formulate Lewis’s original
version of the Principal Principle:
PP͞. Suppose that 𝐶 is an initial credence function. Then, it should hold that:
𝐶(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖∈𝒰.
Here, I will assume that the initial credence functions are regular in the sense that the
function assigns a non-zero value to any non-empty proposition. Note that if the ini-
tial credence function is irregular, then there may be an evidential situation in which
Conditionalization does not place any constraint on the way of updating the function.
Suppose that an initial credence function 𝐶 assigns zero to a non-empty proposition
𝐸, and then receives evidence 𝐸. In this case, the condition of Conditionalization is
not satisϐied, and so it cannot help keeping silence. The assumption is intended to
rule out such a possibility.ͣ
As is well known, however, PP͞ suffers from the so-called ‘Big Bad Bug’. Roughly
speaking, the bug in question is that Lewis’s original Principal Principle is incompat-
ible with his Humean Supervenience. It can be shown, in particular, that if 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑈𝑗) > 0, then PP͞ yields a contradiction—that is, 0 = 𝐶(𝑈𝑗|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑈𝑗) > 0.
So, some philosophers—e.g., Lewis (ͧͧ͟͢), Thau (ͧͧ͟͢), and Hall (ͧͧ͟͢)—provided
a modiϐied version of PP͞, which is often called the New Principle:ͤ
NP͞. Suppose that 𝐶 is an initial credence function. Then, it should hold that:
𝐶(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝑈𝑖), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰.
We can hardly deny, I think, that NP͞ is more plausible than PP͞. However, it is also
noteworthy that, when the following is assumed:
Self-esteem. 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑈𝑖) = 1, for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰.
PP͞ is equivalent to NP͞, and so can circumvent the above contradiction.ͥ My discus-
sion that follows has little bearing onHumean Supervenience and does not attempt to
ͣThis argument for regularity is found in Lewis (ͧͦ͟͞). However, Hájek (͟͠͞͠) points out that there
are various problems that beset regularity. I agree. So, regularity is not regarded, in this paper, as a
requirement of rationality.
ͤThere are other attempts to overcome the bug. For example, see Robert (͟͠͞͞) and Ismael (ͦ͠͞͞).
ͥThe expression ‘Self-esteem’ is intended to express that each chance function is certain that it is
the only one true chance function. Pettigrew (͟͠͞͡) calls this feature of chance functions ‘Immodesty’.
I do not use this name since I will use it in another context.
ͣ
examine the metaphysical plausibility of PP͞ and/or NP͞. For the sake of notational
andmathematical simplicity, thus, Iwill assumeSelf-esteemand regardPP͞ as a norm
governing the relationship between credences and chances. My main result remains
the same even if we accept NP͞ without assuming Self-esteem. (See Appendix.)
It is natural, on theotherhand, that credence-chancenorms like thePrincipal Prin-
ciple should not rule out any kind of credences. In particular, such norms should be
able to constrain any credences nomatterwhat evidential situation the credences are
placed in. However, PP͞ itself concerns only a special kind of evidential situations, in
which the credences have no evidence whatsoever.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that chances are often regarded as an analytic-
expert for credences.ͦ Thus, the credence functions with total evidence 𝐸 should re-
spect the chance functions that also have total evidence 𝐸. Here, let us assume that
the ur-chance function is also updated bymeans of Conditionalization—that is, 𝑐ℎ𝑖 is
updated to 𝑐ℎ𝑖(⋅|𝐸)when 𝑐ℎ𝑖 receives the total evidence𝐸. Then, we have the follow-
ing version of the Principal Principle:
PP+. Suppose that 𝐶𝐸 is a credence function that has total evidence 𝐸. Then, it
should hold that:
𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖∈𝒰,
where the relevant conditional credences and chances are all well deϐined.
Here,𝐶𝐸 is a credence function that is updated from the initial credence function𝐶 by
means of Conditionalization on the total evidence𝐸. Note that PP+ follows from PP͞
and Conditionalization—to put it another way, the Principal Principle is preserved
under Conditionalization.ͧ Thus, superbabies, who are born rational, will satisfy the
principle throughout their credal life as long as they update their credences bymeans
of Conditionalization.
ͦFor example, see Hall (͢͠͞͞). In our context, the chance functions are analytic-experts who satisfy
Self-esteem. Using Hall’s terminology, our chance functions are analytic-experts who know they meet
the (analytic) expert conditions.
ͧSuppose that an initial credence function 𝐶 satisϐies PP͞ and is conditionalized on total evidence
𝐸. Then, it holds that, for any 𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶(𝐴|𝑈𝑖𝐸) = 𝐶(𝐴𝐸|𝑈𝑖)/𝐶(𝐸|𝑈𝑖) =
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)/𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸). Thus, 𝐶𝐸 satisϐies PP+.
ͤ
͡ Chances in the Realistic Credal Life
However, we are not born super. At the beginning of our realistic credal life, we may
have no information regarding objective chances and their relation to our credences,
and so our credences may not satisfy the Principal Principle. Be that as it may, we do
not have to say that objective chances cannot guide our real life via the Principal Prin-
ciple. Althoughwe formour credences at the beginningwithout considering objective
chances, we will correct our credences in accordance with the Principal Principle if
we obtain some relevant information about chances and its relationship to credences.
This kind of correction raises a question: Is there any way of correcting our cre-
dences in accordance with the Principal Principle? In this section, I will attempt to
answer this question in a Bayesian way. That is, I will suggest a way of correcting
credences using a variant of the Bayesian belief updating rule, which is often called
Adams Conditionalization. For this purpose, I will introduce two special kinds of cre-
dence functions, which I will call ‘chance-free’ and ‘chance-fed’ credence functions.
͡.͟ Chance-free and Chance-fed Credence Functions
Suppose that you do not know how objective chances should be related to our cre-
dences and so violate the Principal Principle. Then, it should be said that your cre-
dence function does not reϐlect properly the impact of the chances on your credal sys-
tem. I will call this kind of credence function ‘a chance-free credence function’. Note
that the chance-free functions can have some evidence𝐸 even if they violate the prin-
ciple. Of course, it is also doxastically possible that the chance-free functions do not
have any evidence whatsoever.
Now, suppose that you happen to know that you should satisfy the Principal Prin-
ciple in order to be rational—that is, you happen to know that the chances are given
by one of the functions 𝑐ℎ1, ⋯ , 𝑐ℎ𝑛 and new values should be assigned to the rele-
vant conditional credences according to such chance functions. So, you form a new
credence function by correcting the old one. This new credence functionwill be called
‘a chance-fed credence function’ in the sense that the correction can be regarded as
feeding the impact of the chances into the chance-free credence function via the Prin-
cipal Principle͟͞. As stated, this chance-fed credence function may be placed in vari-
͟͞In our context, all and only chance-free credence functions violate the Principal Principle, and all
and only chance-fed credence functions satisfy the principle. In this paper, however, I am not com-
mitted to the claim that nothing but the Principal Principle properly governs the relationship between
ͥ
ous evidential situations. Somemay have several pieces of evidence, others may have
no evidence except the aforementioned information about chances.
Wecan thinkof this correctionas abelief update fromachance-free credence func-
tion to a chance-fed one. Let 𝐶 be a chance-free credence function with no evidence.
𝐶 may be called the chance-free initial credence function since it has no evidence. Let
𝐶𝐶𝐻 be the chance-fed credence function that is updated from 𝐶 in accordance with
the Principal Principle. Here, the subscript ‘𝐶𝐻 ’ is intended to express that the im-
pact of chances is fed to the chance-free credence function𝐶 via the chance-credence
norm.
What is the difference between𝐶 and𝐶𝐶𝐻? Note that the correction of𝐶 to𝐶𝐶𝐻
ismade in accordancewith the Principal Principle, which says that the conditional cre-
dence function, given that 𝑐ℎ𝑖 is the ur-chance function, should be equal to the chance
function 𝑐ℎ𝑖. In this context, thus, PP͞ could be regarded as a source from which 𝐶
receives new conditional credences. To put it another way, PP͞ could be thought of
as a constraint stating what values should be newly assigned to the conditional cre-
dences in question: For any 𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴) should be newly assigned to
the conditional credence in 𝐴 given 𝑈𝑖. Equivalently, it requires that, for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲
and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤) should be newly assigned to the conditional credence in 𝑤 given
𝑈𝑖.͟͟
Note that this requirement does not directly impose any constraint on credences
other than the conditional credences in question. Then, is there any Bayesian updat-
ing rule governing how other credences should be updated through this kind of cor-
rection? In other words, is there any Bayesian rule stating how our credence function
should evolve when the new conditional credences are obtained, and nothing else?
Fortunately, yes.
chances and credences. As shown in Appendix, the main arguments in this paper will go through even
if the impact of chances is fed into the chance-free credence function via the New Principle. Thus, the
terminology ‘chance-fed’ (and ‘chance-free’) may be applied to a credence function that satisϐies the
New Principle if the principle is accepted as a plausible chance-credence norm.
͟͟Note that it is assumed that 𝑐ℎ𝑖 is a probability function. Thus, the following two propositions are
equivalent to each other: (i) For any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴), if deϐined ; (ii) For any
𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝑤|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤), if deϐined.
ͦ
͡.͠ Correcting Chance-free Credences
What is often called Adams Conditionalization plays such a role.͟͠ Letℰ be a partition
that consists of 𝐸𝑖s. Suppose that a course of experience directly changes an agent’s
conditional credences in some members in ℰ given 𝐹 , and nothing else. Let 𝐶 be a
credence function that the agent has before undergoing the experience, and 𝐶ℰ|𝐹 be
a credence function that she will have after the conditional credences in question are
incorporated into her credal system. Then, Adams Conditionalization is formulated
as follows:
Adams Conditionalization (AC)
𝐶ℰ|𝐹 (𝐴) = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐹)𝐶ℰ|𝐹 (𝐸𝑖|𝐹 )𝐶(𝐴|𝐸𝑖𝐹) + 𝐶(𝐴¬𝐹),
for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
Note that Adams Conditionalization cannot handle a case in which the conditional
credence in 𝐸 given ¬𝐹 , as well as the conditional credence in 𝐸 given 𝐹 , is directly
changed. That is, this kind of Conditionalization itself is not a rule that governs the
way of updating our credence functionwhen conditional credences with various con-
ditioning propositions are directly changed.
However, we need a rule that can be applied to such a case. Note that the cor-
rection in accordance with the Principal Principle requires that, for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 and
𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤) should be newly assigned to the conditional credence in 𝑤 given 𝑈𝑖.
That is, the correction requires us to directly change the conditional credences that
have various conditioning propositions 𝑈1, 𝑈2, ⋯. Fortunately, we can easily gener-
alize Adams Conditionalization so that it can handle such a case. Let ℰ andℱ be two
partitions, whosemembers are𝐸𝑖s and𝐹𝑗s, respectively. Suppose that a course of ex-
perience directly changes an agent’s conditional credences in somemembers ℰ given
𝐹1, some members in ℰ given 𝐹2, ⋯, and nothing else. Let 𝐶 be a credence function
that the agent has before undergoing the experience, and 𝐶ℰ|ℱ be a credence func-
tion that she will have after the conditional credences in question are incorporated
͟͠AdamsConditionalization is namedbyBradley (ͣ͠͞͞). A similar discussion is also found inWagner
(͠͞͞͡). There are some attempts to respond to several difϐiculties of Bayesian epistemology by means
of this kind of Conditionalization. For example, Douven and Romeijn (͟͟͠͞) suggest a solution for the
so-called Judy Benjamin Problem using Adams Conditionalization.
ͧ
into her credal system. Then, Adams Conditionalization is generalized as follows:͟͡
Generalized Adams Conditionalization (GAC)
𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐴) = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ,𝐹𝑗∈ℱ
𝐶(𝐹𝑗)𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑗)𝐶(𝐴|𝐸𝑖𝐹𝑗),
for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
It is noteworthy that GAC is equivalent to AC whenℱ = {𝐹,¬𝐹} and the conditional
credences given ¬𝐹 remain the same.
Now, we can provide a Bayesianway of correcting chance-free credence functions.
In other words, we can formulate a rule governing the way of updating a chance-free
credence function to a chance-fed one in accordance with the Principal Principle. I
will call such a rule the Adams Correcting Rule in the sense that it is formulated by
means of Adams Conditionalization.
Let me ϐirst consider the Adams Correcting Rule for a chance-free initial credence
function that has no evidence whatsoever. As explained, the correction in accordance
with PP͞ requires that, for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤) should be newly assigned
to the conditional credence in 𝑤 given 𝑈𝑖. Then, we can derive a way of correcting
in accordance with the Principal Principle. Let 𝐶 be a chance-free initial credence
function, and𝐶𝐶𝐻 be a chance-fed credence function that is obtained by correcting𝐶
in accordance with the Principal Principle. Then, a version of Adams Correcting Rule
is formulated as follows:͟͢
ACR͞. 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
͟͡To understand the way of generalizing Adams Conditionalization, let me consider the following
equation:
𝐶(𝐴) = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐹)𝐶(𝐸𝑖|𝐹 )𝐶(𝐴|𝐸𝑖𝐹) + 𝐶(𝐴¬𝐹),
which follows from the probability calculus. It is noteworthy that, according to Adams Conditional-
ization, the new credence function 𝐶ℰ|𝐹 is obtained by replacing 𝐶(𝐸𝑖|𝐹 ) in the above equation with
𝐶ℰ|𝐹 (𝐸𝑖|𝐹 ). Now, consider the following equation, which follows from the probability calculus:
𝐶(𝐴) = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐹1)𝐶(𝐸𝑖|𝐹1)𝐶(𝐴|𝐸𝑖𝐹1) + ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐹2)𝐶(𝐸𝑖|𝐹2)𝐶(𝐴|𝐸𝑖𝐹2) + ⋯ .
Then, we can obtain a generalized version of Adams Conditionalization by replacing 𝐶(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑗) with
𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑗) for any𝐸𝑖 and 𝐹𝑗.
͟͢The derivation of ACR͞ from PP͞ and GAC is given in Appendix. Similarly, ACR+, which is formu-
lated below, is derived from PP+ and GAC. This derivation is also given in Appendix.
͟͞
This rule is related to a chance-free initial credence function. However, we can suggest
a similar rule that is related to chance-free credence functions with total evidence𝐸.
Let 𝐶𝐸 be such a function. Let 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 be the chance-fed credence function updated
from 𝐶𝐸 in accordance with PP+. Similar to PP͞, PP+ can be thought of as a norm
stating what values should be newly assigned to some conditional credences—that
is, it requires that for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰, 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤|𝐸) should be newly assigned
to the conditional credence in 𝑤 given 𝑈𝑖. Then, the rule, which governs the way of
feeding the impact of chances to 𝐶𝐸 in accordance with the Principal Principle, can
be formulated as follows:
ACR+. 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
Heretofore, I have formulated some ways of correcting chance-free credence func-
tions in accordance with the Principal Principle. As explained, realistic agents are not
born super, and so they hardly satisfy the principle at the beginning of their credal
life. Nevertheless, if such agents update or correct their credences by means of ACR͞
and ACR+, then they can form the credences in which objective chances are reϐlected
in accordance with the Principal Principle. So far, so good. However, it seems that an
interesting but undesirable result is drawn from such a kind of credence updating or
correcting. In the next section, I will explain and discuss this result.
͢ When Credences Are Corrected
Let 𝐶 be a chance-free credence function without any evidence. Then, we may say
that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 is obtained through a sequential belief updating from 𝐶 , in which 𝐶 is
ϐirst updated to𝐶𝐸 bymeans of Conditionalization, and then𝐶𝐸 is updated to𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻
by means of ACR+. Note that, in the sequential belief updating from 𝐶 to 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 , the
credences are corrected in accordancewith thePrincipal Principleafter the credences
are conditionalized on the total evidence𝐸. In otherwords,𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 is obtainedby con-
ditionalizing ϔirst and then correcting. However, this order can be reversed. That is,
the chance-free credence function can be corrected in accordance with the Principal
Principle before the credences are conditionalized on 𝐸. Let 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 be the credence
function so obtained. That is, 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 is obtained by correcting ϔirst and then condi-
tionalizing.
Note ϐirst the following propositions:
͟͟
Proposition ͟. Suppose that 𝐶 is a chance-free credence function without any evi-
dence. Suppose also that our credences are updated by means of Conditional-
ization, ACR͞, and ACR+. Then, it holds that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰,
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸),
where the relevant conditional credences and chances are well deϐined.
According to this proposition, when credence functions are updated by means of the
relevant rules, PP+ is satisϐied no matter when the chance-free credence function is
corrected. That is, the order in question—i.e., the timing of the correction—does not
affect whether the ϐinal credences satisfy the Principal Principle.
Note also that:
Proposition ͠. Suppose that 𝐶 is a chance-free credence function without any evi-
dence. Suppose also that our credences are updated by means of Conditional-
ization, ACR͞, and ACR+. Then, the following two propositions are equivalent
to each other:
(a) 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
(b) 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑈𝑖), for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰.
According to this proposition, 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 and 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 would be different from each other
exactlywhen the timingof the correctionaffects our credences in theur-chancepropo-
sitions.
Then, are there any evidential situations in which the timing in question has no
inϐluence on the credences in the ur-chance propositions and so 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 is equal to
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸? In this regard, we have that:
Proposition ͡. Suppose that 𝐶 is a chance-free initial credence function. Suppose
also that our credences are updated by means of Conditionalization, ACR͞, and
ACR+. Suppose that:
(͟)𝐸 is a disjunction of some 𝑈𝑖s, or
(͠) there is an 𝑈𝑖 such that𝐸 ⊆ 𝑈𝑖.
Then, it holds that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
Here, 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 and 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 have the same total experience, and they are updated from
the same initial credence function. The only difference between them is the timing of
͟͠
correcting the credences in accordance with the Principal Principle. It is not the case,
however, that the results in question are always the same as each other. That is,
Proposition ͢. Suppose that our credences are updated bymeans of Conditionaliza-
tion, ACR͞, and ACR+. Then, there is a chance-free credence function 𝐶 and
total evidence𝐸 such that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) ≠ 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴), for some𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
This proposition says that the ϐinal credence functions depend onwhen our credences
are corrected. Letme consider the following example for the proof of this proposition.
Example
There are six possible worlds, 𝑤1, ⋯ , and 𝑤6. The ur-chance function of 𝑤1, 𝑤2, and
𝑤3 is 𝑐ℎ1; the ur-chance function of the other worlds is 𝑐ℎ2. Thus, 𝑈1 ≡ 𝑤1 ∨𝑤2 ∨𝑤3
and𝑈2 ≡ 𝑤4∨𝑤5∨𝑤6. Let us assume that𝐸 ≡ 𝑤1∨𝑤2∨𝑤4∨𝑤5 and¬𝐸 ≡ 𝑤3∨𝑤6.
I will describe the relevant probability assignments by means of the following 2 × 3
tables.
Possible Worlds
𝑤1 𝑤4
𝑤2 𝑤5
𝑤3 𝑤6
Each cell of this table refers to the associated possible world. The tables whose cells
are ϐilled with a numerical value express the relevant probability assignments. Here
are such tables.
𝐶
͟/͟͞ ͠/͟͞
͠/͟͞ ͠/͟͞
͠/͟͞ ͟/͟͞
𝑐ℎ1
͟/͡ ͞
͟/͡ ͞
͟/͡ ͞
𝑐ℎ2
͞ ͠/͢
͞ ͟/͢
͞ ͟/͢
These tables express, for example, that𝐶(𝑤1) = 1/10, 𝑐ℎ1(𝑤2) = 1/3, and 𝑐ℎ2(𝑤6) =
1/4. Recall that I assumed Self-esteem. Thus, 𝑐ℎ1(𝑈1) = 𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1 ∨ 𝑤2 ∨ 𝑤3) = 1. A
similar point goes with 𝑐ℎ2.
Now, we can calculate the credence assignments of 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 and 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 using Con-
ditionalization, ACR͞ and ACR+. Figure ͟ displays two different sequential belief up-
dates. Note that 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑤𝑖|𝑈1) = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑤𝑖|𝑈1) = 𝑐ℎ1(𝑤𝑖|𝐸) and 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑤𝑖|𝑈2) =
͟͡
Figure ͟: 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 vs. 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑤𝑖|𝑈2) = 𝑐ℎ2(𝑤𝑖|𝐸) for any 𝑤𝑖. That is, both of 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 and 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 satisfy
PP+. However, 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 ≠ 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 . It holds, for example, that 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑤1) = 4/17 ≠
9/42 = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑤1). Note also that 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑈1) = 8/17 ≠ 18/42 = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈1). This
result means that the ϐinal results are different depending onwhen our credences are
corrected in accordance with the Principal Principle.
As is well known, Bayesian belief updating by means of Jeffrey Conditionalization
is non-commutative in the sense that the ϐinal credence function is sensitive to the or-
der inwhich the new credences are incorporated into the credal system. In this regard,
several philosophers argue that this kind of non-commutativity is not problematic
since the impacts of the new credences on our credal system cannot help being differ-
ent according to the order in question, and this non-commutativity does not happen at
all when the impacts are properly represented using parameters like Bayes factors.ͣ͟
Note that Proposition ͢ and Figure ͟ reveal non-commutativity between condition-
alizing and correcting. Then, someone may attempt to respond, in a similar way, to
this kind of non-commutativity. That is, it may be argued that the impact of correc-
tion through the belief update from𝐶 to𝐶𝐶𝐻 on a credal system is different from the
impact of correction through the belief update from 𝐶𝐸 to 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 on the system, and
ͣ͟See, for example, Jeffrey (͢͠͞͞), Lange (͟͠͞͞), and Wagner (͠͞͞͡). This point can be made in a
different way. One’s credences should be sensitive to one’s total evidence. The order in which one had
the relevant experiences is part of one’s total evidence. If the order is changed, then one changes the
total evidence and so does his credences. Therefore, such non-commutativity is not problematic.
͟͢
so that it is epistemologically intuitive that 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 is different from 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 .
However, this kind of epistemological consideration seems to be of little help in
achieving our epistemic goal. In particular, theremight bedoxastic situations inwhich
we face a decision problem due to non-commutativity between conditionalizing and
correcting. In such a situation, we deliberate which of 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 and 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 should be
adopted as the corrected function—in other words, when our credences should be
corrected. However, the epistemological fact that the impact of correction on the
credal system will be different depending on the timing of correction does not pro-
vide helpful guidance on how we should plan to update our credences.ͤ͟
ͣ Correcting and Accuracy
In the previous section, I have suggested the Adams Correcting Rule and shown that
such a correcting rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing and cor-
recting. This suggestion and observation raise two questions: (a)Why shouldwe cor-
rect our credences by means of the Adams Correcting Rule?; (b) How should we plan
to update our credences if there is a decision problem due to the non-commutativity
in question and we face such a problem? In this section, I will attempt to respond
to these two questions. For this purpose, I will focus on the notion of ‘accuracy’,
which is often regarded as one of themain epistemic values of our credences. Accord-
ing to Accuracy-centred Probabilism, rational agents should strive to have credences
as accurate as possible. Interestingly, such probabilism provides a way of vindicat-
ing the Adams Correcting Rule, and gives a clue to a decision problem due to non-
commutativity between conditionalizing and correcting.
ͣ.͟ Accuracy-centred Probabilism
Before I proceed, a brief note onmeasuring accuracy is in order. Roughly speaking, the
accuracy of a credence function at a world is regarded as something like the distance
between the credences and the truth values at the world. Let 𝒳 be a partition that
consists of 𝑋𝑖s, and 𝐶 be a credence function that assigns each member of 𝒳 to a
ͤ͟As noted in footnote ͣ͟, the order in which we receive the relevant pieces of information may be
taken as a part of our total evidence. By the same token, it may also be said that 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 has different
total evidence from 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 . In what follows, I will assume that, in some relevant situations, we could
decide when our credences are corrected. Under this assumption, the decision between 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 and
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 may be regarded as the decision between two different pieces of total evidence.
ͣ͟
particular real value. Moreover, let 𝑉𝑖 be a truth function such that 𝑉𝑖(𝑋𝑗) = 1when
𝑖 = 𝑗, and 𝑉𝑖(𝑋𝑗) = 0 otherwise. We can say that 𝑉𝑖 represents worlds at which 𝑋𝑖
is true and the other members of𝒳 are false. Lastly, let ℑ𝒳(𝐶, 𝑉𝑖) be a function that
measures the inaccuracy of a credence function 𝐶 with respect to𝒳 at 𝑉𝑖. Suppose,
for example, that the inaccuracy is measured by the Brier score. Then, the inaccuracy
of 𝐶 with respect to𝒳 at 𝑉𝑖 is as follows:
ℑ𝒳(𝐶, 𝑉𝑖) = ∑
𝑋𝑗∈𝒳
(𝐶(𝑋𝑗) − 𝑉𝑖(𝑋𝑗))
2 .
Now, we can deϐine the expected inaccuracy of𝐶 with respect to𝒳. The expected val-
ues in the decision theory are weighted averages with the weights being a credence
assigned by a particular credence function. That is, the expected values are always
determined by the light of a particular credence function. Thus, the expected inaccu-
racy of a credence function 𝐶′ with respect to𝒳 is also determined by the light of a
credence function 𝐶 . Then, the expected inaccuracy of 𝐶′ with respect to 𝒳 by the
light of 𝐶 , which will be referred to as ‘𝐸𝐼𝐶[𝐶′,𝒳]’, is formulated as follows:
𝐸𝐼𝐶[𝐶′,𝒳] = ∑
𝑋𝑖∈𝒳
𝐶(𝑋𝑖)ℑ𝒳(𝐶′, 𝑉𝑖).
Note that, besides the Brier score, there are various candidates for the inaccuracy
measure.ͥ͟ Regarding such candidates, several conditions are assumed—for exam-
ple, Truth-directedness, Convexity, Extentionality, and so forth. Among them, what is
called Immodesty is intimately related to our discussion. Here is the assumption:
Immodesty. Suppose that the inaccuracy of any credence function with respect
to a partition𝒳 is measured by ℑ𝒳. Then, it holds that, for any credence func-
tions 𝐶 and 𝐶′,
𝐸𝐼𝐶[𝐶,𝒳] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶[𝐶′,𝒳],
where equality holds if and only if 𝐶(𝑋𝑖) = 𝐶′(𝑋𝑖) for any𝑋𝑖 ∈ 𝒳.
In words, Immodesty says that any credence function has the unique minimum ex-
pected inaccuracy by the light of its own credence assignment.
ͥ͟For the candidates, see Joyce (ͧ͠͞͞) and Pettigrew (ͤ͟͠͞a) for example.
ͤ͟
ͣ.͠ An Argument for Adams Correction
With these deϐinitions and assumptions in hand, we can argue for the Adams Correct-
ing Rule. Note that, besides the Adams Correcting Rule, there are many ways of cor-
recting our credences in accordance with the Principal Principle. What is required
of such ways is just that the corrected credence functions satisfy the principle. So,
we should say that the Adams Correcting Rule is not a unique way of correcting our
credences.ͦ͟ Interestingly, however, we can show that, in view of Accuracy-centred
Probabilism, the Adams Correcting Rule has an epistemic merit that the other cor-
recting rules do not have.
To see this, let me consider an agent who has a chance-free credence function 𝐶
at time 𝑡. (Here, I do not assume that 𝐶 is an initial credence function. That is, 𝐶
would be a chance-free credence function with total evidence𝐸.) The agent happens
to knowat 𝑡′(> 𝑡) that she should satisfy thePrincipal Principle in order tobe rational.
(It is assumed that she does not obtain any other information between 𝑡 and 𝑡′.) Thus,
she decides to correct her credences immediately. Then, what rule should she adopt
at 𝑡′ for the correction? As mentioned, there are many rules that can correct 𝐶 in
accordancewith the Principal Principle. LetR be such a rule for her credence function
𝐶 . In addition, let𝐶R be the corrected credence function from𝐶 bymeans ofR. Lastly,
let ℝ be the set of such rules. Then, which of members of ℝ should the agent adopt at
𝑡′?
In response to this question, Accuracy-centred Probabilists may require the agent
to adopt the correcting rule that leads her to a chance-fed credence function that has
the minimal expected inaccuracy. It is noteworthy here that, when the agent deliber-
ates what correcting rule should be adopted, she has the chance-free credence func-
tion 𝐶 , and thus the expected inaccuracy in question is determined by the light of
𝐶 . In this regard, someone may say, “𝐶 violates the Principal Principle, which is a
requirement of rationality. So, the expected inaccuracy in question, which is deter-
mined by the light of the irrational credence function𝐶 , cannot provide any guidance
on what correcting rule should be adopted. In other words, we should not adopt any
correcting rule that is recommended by the irrational function 𝐶 .”
ͦ͟Consider the example in the previous section. Suppose that the chance-free initial credence func-
tion 𝐶 is corrected to a credence function 𝐶∗ whose credence assignment is as follows: 𝐶∗(𝑤1) =
𝐶∗(𝑤2) = 𝐶∗(𝑤3) = 1/12 and 𝐶∗(𝑤4) = 2𝐶∗(𝑤5) = 2𝐶∗(𝑤6) = 3/8. Note that 𝐶∗(𝑤𝑖|𝑈1) =
𝐶∗(𝑤𝑖|𝑈1) = 𝑐ℎ1(𝑤𝑖|𝐸) and 𝐶∗(𝑤𝑖|𝑈2) = 𝐶∗(𝑤𝑖|𝑈2) = 𝑐ℎ2(𝑤𝑖|𝐸). That is, this function satisϐies
the Principal Principle. However, 𝐶∗ is not equal to 𝐶𝐶𝐻 , which is corrected by means of the Adams
Correcting Rule, namely ACR͞.
ͥ͟
How can we respond to this worry? First of all, we need to note that 𝐶 recom-
mends a correcting rule in ℝ, which leads the agent to a credence function satisfying
the Principal Principle. Thus, the credence function, which is led by a rule that𝐶 rec-
ommends, is at least rationally permissible. That is, the recommendation of 𝐶 does
not lead us to any outrageously irrational credence function. So, we may conclude
that the worry in question is not as serious as it may sound. Secondly, I would like
to point out that the agent seeks a way of doing the best within her epistemic limi-
tations. When the agent happens to know the irrationality of her credence function,
she has no idea what rational credence function should guide the correction of her
credences. If she knows that, then she would not need to consider how to correct
her credences. This being the case, there seems to be no other way but to evaluate
the expected inaccuracy by her current function 𝐶 . Admittedly, these responses are
not enough. Indeed, it needs to be argued that the correcting rules recommended by
𝐶 are all what rationality requires us to adopt. However, I will not provide such an
argument in this paper. Rather, I will assume that.ͧ͟
On the other hand, there is another point that we should address regarding the
expected inaccuracy in question. Note, in particular, that Proposition ͠ can be gen-
eralized. That is, it holds that if 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 are credence functions that satisfy the
Principal Principle, then the following two propositions are equivalent to each other:
(i) 𝐶1(𝐴) = 𝐶2(𝐴), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲; (ii) 𝐶1(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶2(𝑈𝑖), for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰.͠͞ Thus, we
can say that the decision among the correcting rules in ℝ depends on what credences
each corrected function assigns to the ur-chance propositions. Then, when we eval-
uate the correcting rules according to Accuracy-centred Probabilism, it may be suf-
ϐicient to consider the expected inaccuracy with respect to the partition 𝒰. To put it
another way, Accuracy-centred Probabilists may require the above agent to adopt a
rule that is expected to lead her to a chance-fed credence function that has the mini-
mally inaccurate opinion about the ur-chance function.
Now, we can formulate clearly a principle to which Accuracy-centred Probabilists
may appeal in order to evaluate the correcting rules in question. Here is such a prin-
ciple:
Minimizing Expected Inaccuracy with the Principal Principle (MIPP). Letℝ
be a set of updating rules for a chance-free credence function 𝐶 . Suppose that
ͧ͟This line of response to a similar problem is also found in Pettigrew (ͤ͟͠͞a, ͧͧ͟-͠͞͞). I owe a debt
of gratitude to an anonymous referee for helping me make this point clear.
͠͞The proof of this is basically the same as the proof of Proposition ͠, which is given in Appendix.
ͦ͟
each rule inℝ corrects𝐶 to a chance-fed credence function. Suppose also that an
agentwith𝐶 is to correct her credences so as to abide by the Principal Principle.
Then, it is a requirement of rationality that she adopts a rule in ℝ that corrects
𝐶 to a chance-fed credence function that has the minimal expected inaccuracy
with respect to𝒰 by the light of𝐶 . That is, it is a requirement of rationality that
any agent with 𝐶 adopts R in ℝ such that, for any R∗ ∈ ℝ,
𝐸𝐼𝐶[𝐶R, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶[𝐶R
∗, 𝒰].
As the following proposition states, on the other hand, the Adams Correcting Rule has
an epistemologically desirable feature that the other rules do not have.
Proposition ͣ. Let ℝ be a set of updating rules for a chance-free credence function
𝐶𝐸 , which has total evidence 𝐸. Suppose that each rule in ℝ corrects 𝐶𝐸 to a
credence-fed function. Suppose also that R is the Adams Correcting Rule, i.e.,
ACR+. Then, it holds that, for any R∗ ∈ ℝ,
𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R𝐸, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R
∗
𝐸 , 𝒰],
where equality holds if and only if 𝐶R𝐸 = 𝐶R
∗
𝐸 .
Roughly speaking, this proposition states that the chance-fed credence function ob-
tained by the Adams Correcting Rule is expected to be less inaccurate than any other
chance-fed functions—that is, such a chance-fed function has the minimal expected
inaccuracy with respect to𝒰 by the light of 𝐶𝐸 .
In order to prove this proposition, we should pay attention to Immodesty, accord-
ing to which any credence function has the unique minimum expected inaccuracy by
the light of its own credence assignments. Thus, Immodesty implies that𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R𝐸, 𝒰]
has the uniqueminimal value if and only if𝐶R𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) for any𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰. Interest-
ingly, when the chance-free function𝐶𝐸 is corrected to𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 bymeans of the Adams
Correcting Rule, it holds that𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑖) for any𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰. Thus, we can con-
clude that the expected inaccuracy of the corrected function with respect to𝒰 by the
light of 𝐶𝐸 has the minimal value exactly when the chance-free function is corrected
by means of the Adams Correcting Rule. (A detailed proof is given in Appendix.)
As a result, it follows fromMIPP and Proposition ͣ that:
Adams Correction. Suppose that an agent has a chance-free credence function
ͧ͟
𝐶𝐸 , which has total evidence 𝐸. Suppose also that she happens to know (and
nothing else) that she should satisfy the Principal Principle in order to be ra-
tional. Suppose even that she is to correct her credences so as to abide by the
principle. Then, it is a requirement of rationality that she should correct her
credences by means of ACR+.
We can also provide a similar argument for ACR͞. Thus, this result could be regarded
as an epistemic vindication of the Adams Correcting Rule.
As shown above, my argument for the Adams Correcting Rule heavily depends on
the notion of accuracy and a decision-theoretic framework. This notion and frame-
work shed light on a decision problem due to non-commutativity between condition-
alizing and correcting.
ͣ.͡ Non-commutativitybetweenConditionalizingandCorrecting
Consider again the agent who has a chance-free credence function 𝐶𝐸 . She is to cor-
rect her credences in accordance with the Principal Principle. If she corrects her cre-
dences bymeans of ACR+, then shewill have𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 after correcting. (Hereafter, I will
use ‘𝐶𝐶𝐻 ’, ‘𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 ’, and ‘𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸’ as the notations that stand for the credence functions
that are updated bymeans of Conditionalization and Adams Correcting Rule.) Here, it
is worth noting that there may be other ways of correcting her credences. For exam-
ple, shemay consider ϐirstwhat her initial credence function should have been in order
to abide by the Principal Principle, and then conditionalize the corrected function on
𝐸. In our context, the corrected function in question is 𝐶𝐶𝐻 . So, if she corrects her
credences in this way, then she will have 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 after correcting. Indeed, this kind of
correction is not entirely new—for example, Meacham (ͤ͟͠͞, ͣ͢͟-ͣ͢͠) discusses this
way of correcting an agent’s credences that violates the Principal Principle.͟͠ Then,
the agent faces a decision problem: Which of𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 and𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 should she adopt her
new credence function?
AsPropositionͣ states, the relevant expected inaccuracyof𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻mustbegreater
than of 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 if the two credence functions are different from each other. Thus, we
can say, with the help of MIPP, that it is irrational that the agent, who has the chance-
͟͠Meacham (ͤ͟͠͞, ͣ͢͟-ͣ͢͠) regards a very similar example as a motivation for adopting what he
calls Ur Prior Conditionalization. He formulates Ur Prior Conditionalization as follows: If a subject
has ur-priors 𝑢𝑝 and current evidence 𝐸, her credence 𝑐𝑟 should be 𝑐𝑟(⋅) = 𝑢𝑝(⋅|𝐸), if deϐined. Here,
‘ur-priors’ corresponds to our ‘initial credences’.
͠͞
free credence function𝐶𝐸 , corrects her credence function to the chance-fed credence
function 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 . That is, rationality seems to favor 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 over 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 , in this situa-
tion.
In this regard, someonemay think that theway, which leads the agent to𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 , is
not always available to her. For example, if the agent entirely forgets her past credence
function, i.e., the chance-free initial credence function 𝐶 , then she may have no idea
how to determine her corrected credence function, i.e., 𝐶𝐶𝐻 . In such a case, she may
regard the way in question as useless, and so does not have to wrestle with the non-
commutativity between conditionalizing and correcting.
However, we are able to imagine another doxastic situation in which the non-
commutativity at issue yields a decision problem. Suppose that an agent has a chance-
free initial credence function𝐶 at time 𝑡. Suppose also that she happens to obtain the
following two pieces of information at 𝑡′(> 𝑡) and nothing else: (i) she should sat-
isfy the Principal Principle in order to be rational; (ii) shewill receive the information
about the truth value of 𝐸 at 𝑡″(> 𝑡′). Suppose even that the agent is to update and
correct her credences at 𝑡″—that is, she is to update and correct her credence function
𝐶 when she receives the information.
Having the non-commutativity at issue inmind, wemay ϐind that there are at least
two kinds of credence function that she will have at 𝑡″. Suppose that the agent gets
to know at 𝑡″ that 𝐸 is true. Then, she may update 𝐶 to 𝐶𝐸 by means of Conditional-
ization on 𝐸, and then correct 𝐶𝐸 to 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 by means of the Adams Correcting Rule.
Or, she may correct 𝐶 to 𝐶𝐶𝐻 by means of the Adams Correcting Rule, and then up-
date 𝐶𝐶𝐻 to 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 by means of Conditionalization on 𝐸. That is, when she receives
the information about the truth value of𝐸, she may update her credence function by
means of a rule that requires to conditionalize ϔirst and then correct, or by means of a
rule that requires to correct ϔirst and then conditionalize. Let me call the former ‘the
Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule’ and the latter ‘the Correcting-ϐirst Rule’. Then, which of
the two rules should the agent adopt at 𝑡″?͠͠
Interestingly, we can argue, in the spirit of Accuracy-centred Probabilism, that it is
a requirement of rationality that the agent should plan to adopt the Conditionalizing-
͠͠Some readers may think that there is another way of incorporating the two pieces of information
into the credal system. Note that the Conditionalizing-ϐirst and Correcting-ϐirst Rules might be re-
garded as sequential updating rules. However, the two pieces of information might be simultaneously
incorporated into the credal system. I do not rule out this possibility in this paper. Be that as it may,
we do not have to consider separately such a way. This is because the following discussion shows that
the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule has an epistemic merit that any other relevant rules do not have.
͟͠
ϐirst Rule. That is, it can be shown that the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule has the mini-
mal expected inaccuracy with respect to 𝒰 by the light of 𝐶 .͠͡ To see this, we should
formulate ϐirst the expected inaccuracy of the relevant rules themselves—not the cre-
dence functions obtained bymeans of such rules. Letℰ be a partitionwhose elements
𝐸𝑖s represent possible new evidence. Let Rℰ refer to an updating rule on ℰ that leads
the agent to a chance-fed credence function that respects evidence from ℰ. This rule
can be regarded as a function that associates a particular piece of evidence with a
chance-fed function in question. Let 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 refer to the chance-fed function that is ob-
tained by means of Rℰ when evidence𝐸𝑖 is received.͢͠
Now, we can formulate the expected inaccuracy of Rℰ with respect to a partition
𝒰 by the light of 𝐶 . Suppose that the agent updates her credence function by means
of Rℰ. Then, the inaccuracy of her new credence function with respect to 𝒰 depends
on not only the evidence that she receives, but also the truth values of 𝑈𝑖s. Suppose,
for example, that she receives𝐸𝑖, and that𝑈𝑗 is true. Then, her credence functionwill
be updated to 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 , and its inaccuracy will be equal to ℑ𝒰(𝐶
R
𝐸𝑖, 𝑉𝑗). So, the expected
inaccuracy of Rℰ with respect to 𝒰 by the light of a credence function 𝐶 is deϐined as
follows:
𝐸𝐼𝐶[Rℰ, 𝒰] = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ,𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶(𝐸𝑖𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸𝑖, 𝑉𝑗).
With this kind of expected inaccuracy in hand, we can prove the following propo-
sition:ͣ͠
Proposition ͤ. Let ℝℰ be a set of updating rules on ℰ for a chance-free credence
function 𝐶 . Suppose that each rule in ℝℰ updates 𝐶 to a credence-fed func-
tion that respects evidence fromℰ—that is,𝐶R𝐸𝑖 satisϐies the Principal Principle
and assigns 𝐸𝑖 to ͟, for any Rℰ ∈ ℝℰ and 𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ. Suppose also that Rℰ is the
Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule on ℰ for 𝐶 such that 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 = 𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝐶𝐻 , for any 𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ.
͠͡The following argument is basically similar to Accuracy-centred Probabilists’ argument for a syn-
chronic version of Conditionalization. For example, see Easwaran (͟͠͞͡), Pettigrew (ͤ͟͠͞a), Wallace
and Greaves (ͤ͠͞͞).
͢͠Here, we should note that this rule (or function) takes as arguments only the evidence that will be
received later. Thus, the rule in question has nothing to dowith the credence function that the relevant
agents have before receiving evidence. In other words, Rℰ says nothing about what credence function
the agents should have before receiving evidence from ℰ.
ͣ͠The proof of Proposition ͤ is very similar to the proof of Proposition ͣ. In particular, both proofs
rely on Immodesty and the fact that the credences in the ur-chance propositions remain the samewhen
a credence function is corrected bymeans of the Adams Correcting Rule. The detailed proof is given in
Appendix.
͠͠
Then, it holds that, for any R∗ℰ ∈ ℝℰ,
𝐸𝐼𝐶[Rℰ, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶[R∗ℰ, 𝒰],
where equality holds if and only if 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 = 𝐶
R∗
𝐸𝑖 for any𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ.
Roughly speaking, this proposition states that, in the relevant doxastic situation, the
Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule is expected to be less inaccurate than any other rules in
ℝℰ—that is, such a rule has the minimal expected inaccuracy with respect to 𝒰 by
the light of 𝐶 . As a result, MIPP and this proposition imply, mutatis mutandis, the
following principle:ͤ͠
Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst. Suppose that an agent has a chance-free credence func-
tion𝐶 at time 𝑡. Suppose also that she happens to knows at 𝑡′(> 𝑡) the following
two things and nothing else: (i) she should satisfy the Principal Principle in or-
der to be rational; (ii) shewill receive evidence fromℰ at 𝑡″(> 𝑡′). Suppose even
that she is to update her credences at 𝑡″ so as to abide by the Principal Principle
and respect evidence. Then, it is a requirement of rationality that she adopts
the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule Rℰ on ℰ for 𝐶 such that 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 = 𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝐶𝐻 , for any
𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ.
This result, I think, is somewhat interesting. In particular, this principle provides
an guidance on how agents in the relevant doxastic situation should incorporate the
two pieces of information, i.e., (i) and (ii), into her credal system at 𝑡″. That is, this
principle says that such agents should update and correct her credences by means of
the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule, rather than any other rules, including the Correcting-
ϐirst Rule.
I should, however, add some caveats. Consider a doxastic situation in which you
have no idea from what partition you will receive evidence. Plan Conditionalizing-
ϐirst cannot apply to this kind of doxastic situation. What the principle says is just
that, when you know the partition from which you will receive evidence, you should
plan to incorporate the two pieces of information, i.e., (i) and (ii), into your credal
ͤ͠In order for MIPP and Proposition ͤ to imply Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst, MIPP needs to be slightly
modiϐied. Note that MIPP appearing in Section ͣ.͠ is related to the expected inaccuracy of a particu-
lar credence-fed function. However, what is needed to imply Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst is a principle
about the expected inaccuracy of an updating rule. Of course, such a modiϐied version can be readily
formulated in a similar way of MIPP.
͠͡
system according to the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule. For this reason, we should say
that Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst can apply to only a few doxastic situations.
Moreover, there is another reason that we should think the principle has a very
narrow scope of application. To see this, we need to note that Plan Conditionalizing-
ϐirst can only apply to agents who are to update their credences at 𝑡″so as to abide
by the Principal Principle and respect evidence. In other words, the principle can
only apply to agents who are to correct her credences when they receive evidence.
Suppose that an agent, who has a chance-free credence function, happens to know (i)
and (ii) at a given time. Suppose also that she is to correct her credences immediately
regardless of what evidence will be received. Then, Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst itself
cannot apply to such an agent, and so provides no guidance on her correcting plan.
In this connection, we should also note that this principle does not require you to
postpone the correction until the evidence is received. Some readersmight think that
if you adopt theConditionalizing-ϐirst rule in the relevant doxastic situation, then your
credence function between 𝑡′ and 𝑡″ should stay uncorrected. However, the principle
itself does not require that. Rather, what the principle considers is just the credence
function at 𝑡″ that you will have when the evidence is received. Thus, we should say
that Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst has nothing to dowith the credence function between
𝑡′ and 𝑡″.ͥ͠
It is hard to deny that these caveats disclose that Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst has a
very narrow scope of application, and so is tooweak. I agree. However, this point does
not make the principle useless. Indeed, Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst shows a substan-
ͥ͠Then, is there any rational way of deciding what credence functionwe have between 𝑡′ and 𝑡″? Let
me consider the following argument. Suppose that, at time 𝑡′, an agent, whose credence function 𝐶
violates the Principal Principle, gets to know (i) and (ii) appearing in Plan Conditionalizing-ϐirst. Sup-
pose also that she knows at 𝑡′ that she always updates her credences by means of Conditionalization
on evidence. At time 𝑡′, she deliberateswhether she corrects her credences immediately or puts off the
correction until receiving evidence from ℰ. Note that she knows at 𝑡′ that she is a conditionalizer. So,
she also knows at 𝑡′ that if she corrects her credences immediately, then she will have one of 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸𝑖s
at time 𝑡″. However, Proposition ͤ says that, by the light of her current credence function𝐶 , this result
does not have the minimal expected inaccuracy. Thus, it seems rational that the agent does not cor-
rect her credences immediately. In this paper, however, I am not committed to this conclusion. This
is partially because of the assumption that the agent in question knows that she always updates her
credences by means of Conditionalization. There may be some arguments for having such knowledge.
However, I leave the matter open for further investigation. Be that as it may, I would like to empha-
size here that what credence function we should have between 𝑡′ and 𝑡″ does not undermine the main
point I wish to argue for here. This is because Proposition ͤ, whichmymain results heavily depend on,
concerns only the credence function at 𝑡″, and the proposition can still follow nomatter what credence
function we should have between 𝑡′ and 𝑡″. Many thanks to anonymous referees for encouraging me
to make these points clear.
͢͠
tial difference between the Conditionalizing-ϐirst and the Correcting-ϐirst Rule. We
could formulate another relevant principle that may be called Plan Correcting-ϐirst,
which corresponds to theCorrecting-ϐirstRule. This principle, unlikePlanConditionalizing-
ϐirst, cannotbe the case, however. For this reason,we could think that theConditionalizing-
ϐirstRulehas anepistemicmerit that anyother relevant rules, including theCorrecting-
ϐirst Rule, do not have. In regard to non-commutativity in question, we can conclude
that there is a doxastic situation in which we should favor the Conditionalizing-ϐirst
Rule over the Correcting-ϐirst Rule.
ͤ Concluding Remarks
Admittedly, my discussions have little to do with superbabies who are born rational.
Such agents satisfy the Principal Principle throughout their credal life as long as they
are conditionalizers. Thus, they do not face any situation inwhich they have to correct
their credences in accordance with the principle. However, we are not born rational
and so we should correct our credences at some time or other using our information
about chances. In this regard, I have argued that such a realistic agent should adopt
the Adams Correcting Rule. Moreover, it is also argued that, when an agent faces a
decision problem due to non-commutativity between conditionalizing and correct-
ing, the agent should plan to adopt the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule, given the relevant
assumptions. As mentioned, objective chances are often regarded as an expert that
our credences should respect. Note that the way of respecting an expert is basically
the same as the Principal Principle. Then, we may derive similar conclusions.
Accuracy-centred Probabilists have recently suggested several interesting argu-
ments for various epistemic norms—for example, Probabilism, the Principle of Indif-
ference, Reϐlection, a synchronic version of Conditionalization, and so forth. In doing
so, they focus on the epistemic notions like accuracy and use the relevant decision-
theoretic principles. Similarly, my arguments in this paper heavily depend on such
notions and principles. Admittedly, the rules and principles that I have suggested
here are rather weak. Nevertheless, my suggestion, I think, may contribute to extend-
ing the scope of application of Accuracy-centred Probabilism.
Acknowledgments Some earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ͥth
Asia-Paciϐic Conference onPhilosophy of Science and theQuarterlyMeeting of Korean
ͣ͠
Association for Logic. I am grateful to the audience of the conferences for their com-
ments and feedback. Special thanks are due toAlanHájek, Jaemin Jung, andNamjoong
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Appendix
The followingproofs andderivations have various conditional credences and chances.
For presentational simplicity, I will assume in what follows that such conditional cre-
dences and chances are all well deϐined. I think this assumption yields no confusion.
A derivation of ACR͞ from PP͞ and GAC:
Suppose that 𝐶𝐶𝐻 satisϐies PP͞, and that 𝐶𝐶𝐻 is updated from 𝐶 by means of GAC.
Then we have that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰,𝑤𝑗∈𝒲
𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝐶(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝑤𝑗|𝑈𝑖)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰,𝑤𝑗∈𝒲
𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝐶(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈𝒲
𝐶(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈𝐴
𝐶(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗)
+ ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈¬𝐴
𝐶(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈𝐴
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴),
as required.
ͤ͠
A derivation of ACR+ from PP+ and GAC:
Suppose that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 satisϐies PP+, and that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 is updated from 𝐶𝐸 by means of
GAC. Then we have that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰,𝑤𝑗∈𝒲
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑤𝑗|𝑈𝑖)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰,𝑤𝑗∈𝒲
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗|𝐸)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈𝒲
𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗|𝐸)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈𝐴
𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗|𝐸)
+ ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈¬𝐴
𝐶𝐸(𝐴|𝑤𝑗𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗|𝐸)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) ∑
𝑤𝑗∈𝐴
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤𝑗|𝐸) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸),
as required.
A proof of Proposition ͟:
Suppose that our credences are updated by means of Conditionalization, ACR͞, and
ACR+. It is straightforward that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑤|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤|𝐸) for any 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, and so
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸) for any 𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲. Similarly, we have that 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝑤|𝑈𝑖) =
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤), and so that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = ∑
𝑤∈𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝑤|𝑈𝑖) = ∑
𝑤∈𝐴
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝑤) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴).
Then, Conditionalization and the above equation imply that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈
𝒰,
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖𝐸) =
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴𝐸|𝑈𝑖)
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖)
= 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸).
Then, we have Proposition ͟. Done.
ͥ͠
A proof of Proposition ͠:
Note that 𝑈𝑖 ⊆ 𝒲 for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰. Thus, it is straightforward that (a) implies (b).
Now, let me prove that (b) implies (a). For this purpose, let’s assume (b)—that is,
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑈𝑖) for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰. From this assumption and Proposition ͟,
then, it follows that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝑈𝑖) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴|𝑈𝑖)
= 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴),
as required.
A proof of Proposition ͡:
According to ACR+ and Conditionalization, we have that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑
𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖|𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸). (͟)
Similarly, it follows from Conditionalization and ACR͞ that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴|𝐸) =
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴𝐸)
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐸)
=
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸)
. (͠)
First, letmeprove that if𝐸 is a disjunctionof some𝑈𝑖s, then it holds that𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) =
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲. Suppose that𝐸 is a disjunction of some𝑈𝑖s. Let𝒰𝐸 be the
set of the disjuncts in question. Then, it holds that 𝑈𝑖 implies 𝐸 when 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰𝐸 , and
𝑈𝑖 implies ¬𝐸 otherwise. Moreover, 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸) = 1when 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰𝐸 , and 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸) = 0 oth-
erwise. (Note that Self-esteem was assumed.) From this, it follows that 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸) =
𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴)when 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰𝐸 , and 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸) = 0 otherwise. Then, we have that,
ͦ͠
for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) =
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸)
=
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸) +∑𝑈𝑖∉𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸) +∑𝑈𝑖∉𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸)
=
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)
=
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐸 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)
=
∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸)
𝐶(𝐸) = ∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑖|𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸) = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴),
as required.
Now, let usprove that if there is a𝑈𝑖 such that𝐸 ⊆ 𝑈𝑖, then it holds that𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) =
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) for any 𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲. Suppose that there is an ur-chance proposition that is a
subset of 𝐸. Let 𝑈𝑘 be such a proposition. Then, it holds that 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸) = 𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸) = 0
when 𝑈𝑖 ≠ 𝑈𝑘, and that 𝐶(𝑈𝑘|𝐸) = 1. Then, we have that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) =
∑𝑈𝑖 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸)
=
∑𝑈𝑖=𝑈𝑘 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸) +∑𝑈𝑖≠𝑈𝑘 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
∑𝑈𝑖=𝑈𝑘 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸) +∑𝑈𝑖≠𝑈𝑘 𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐸)
= 𝐶(𝑈𝑘)𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐴𝐸)𝐶(𝑈𝑘)𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐸)
= 𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐴|𝐸);
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) =∑
𝑈𝑖
𝐶(𝑈𝑖|𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸)
= ∑
𝑈𝑖=𝑈𝑘
𝐶(𝑈𝑖|𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸) + ∑
𝑈𝑖≠𝑈𝑘
𝐶(𝑈𝑖|𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴𝐸)
= 𝐶(𝑈𝑘|𝐸)𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐴|𝐸) = 𝑐ℎ𝑘(𝐴|𝐸).
Thus, it holds that 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲. Done.
ͧ͠
Several calculations related to Proposition ͢ and Figure ͟:
As assumed in the example related to Figure ͟, 𝒰 = {𝑈1, 𝑈2}. Then, it follows from
(͟) and (͠) in the proof of Proposition ͡ that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = 𝐶(𝑈1)𝑐ℎ1(𝐴) + 𝐶(𝑈2)𝑐ℎ2(𝐴), (͢a)
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) =
𝐶(𝑈1)𝑐ℎ1(𝐴𝐸) + 𝐶(𝑈2)𝑐ℎ2(𝐴𝐸)
𝐶(𝑈1)𝑐ℎ1(𝐸) + 𝐶(𝑈2)𝑐ℎ2(𝐸)
, (͢b)
𝐶𝐸(𝐴) =
𝐶(𝐴𝐸)
𝐶(𝐸) , and (͢c)
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = 𝐶(𝑈1|𝐸)𝑐ℎ1(𝐴|𝐸) + 𝐶(𝑈2|𝐸)𝑐ℎ2(𝐴|𝐸). (͢d)
Note that𝐸 ≡ 𝑤1 ∨ 𝑤2 ∨ 𝑤4 ∨ 𝑤5, 𝑈1 ≡ 𝑤1 ∨ 𝑤2 ∨ 𝑤3, and 𝑈2 ≡ 𝑤4 ∨ 𝑤5 ∨ 𝑤6. With
the help of (͢a)-(͢d), the chance assignments of 𝑐ℎ′ and 𝑐ℎ∗, and the initial credence
assignment of 𝐶 , we have that, for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲,
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴) =
1
2𝑐ℎ1(𝐴) +
1
2𝑐ℎ2(𝐴),
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝐴) =
12
17 (𝑐ℎ1(𝐴𝐸) + 𝑐ℎ2(𝐴𝐸)) ,
𝐶𝐸(𝐴) =
10
7 𝐶(𝐴𝐸), and
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) =
9
14𝑐ℎ1(𝐴𝐸) +
16
21𝑐ℎ2(𝐴𝐸).
Now, we can derive the probability assignments of 𝐶𝐶𝐻 , 𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸 , 𝐶𝐸 , and 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 . For
example,
𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝑤1) =
1
2𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1) +
1
2𝑐ℎ2(𝑤1) =
1
2𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1) =
1
6;
𝐶𝐶𝐻,𝐸(𝑤1) =
12
17 (𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1𝐸) + 𝑐ℎ2(𝑤1𝐸)) =
12
17𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1) =
4
17;
𝐶𝐸(𝑤1) =
10
7 𝐶(𝑤1𝐸) =
10
7 𝐶(𝑤1) =
1
7; and
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑤1) =
9
14𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1𝐸) +
16
21𝑐ℎ2(𝑤1𝐸) =
9
14𝑐ℎ1(𝑤1) =
3
14.
These results conform with the probability assignments in Figure ͟.
͡͞
Proofs of Propositions ͣ and ͤ:
Letme start with noting that it follows fromGAC and the probability calculus that: for
any 𝐹𝑘 ∈ ℱ,
𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐹𝑘) = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ,𝐹𝑗∈ℱ
𝐶(𝐹𝑗)𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑗)𝐶(𝐹𝑘|𝐸𝑖𝐹𝑗)
= ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ,𝐹𝑗=𝐹𝑘
𝐶(𝐹𝑗)𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑗)𝐶(𝐹𝑘|𝐸𝑖𝐹𝑗)
+ ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ,𝐹𝑗≠𝐹𝑘
𝐶(𝐹𝑗)𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑗)𝐶(𝐹𝑘|𝐸𝑖𝐹𝑗)
= ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐹𝑘)𝐶ℰ|ℱ(𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑘) = 𝐶(𝐹𝑘).
That is, when some experience directly changes the relevant conditional credences,
and so𝐶 is updated to𝐶ℰ|ℱ bymeans of GAC, the credences in the conditioningpropo-
sitions, namely 𝐹𝑖s, remain the same. As explained above, the correction of 𝐶𝐸 to
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 by means of ACR+ can be regarded as a belief updating by means of GAC, in
which the conditioning propositions are the ur-chance propositions 𝑈𝑖s. So, the cre-
dences in 𝑈𝑖s remain the same through the correction in question. More formally, it
holds that: for any𝐸 ⊆ 𝒲 and 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰,
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶(𝑈𝑖|𝐸). (A)
Now, with this mathematical feature of the Adams Correcting Rule in hand, we can
prove Propositions ͣ and ͤ.
Aproof of Propositionͣ: Letℝbe a set of updating rules for a chance-free credence
function 𝐶𝐸 . All members of ℝ correct 𝐶𝐸 to a chance-fed function. Let R be the
Adams Correcting Rule, i.e., ACR+. Then, it holds that 𝐶R𝐸 = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 . Moreover, let R∗
be a correcting rule in ℝ. Then, Immodesty implies that,
𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸[𝐶
R
𝐸, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸[𝐶
R∗
𝐸 , 𝒰], (ͣa)
͟͡
where equality holds if and only if 𝐶R𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶R
∗
𝐸 (𝑈𝑖) for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰. Note that
𝐶R𝐸 = 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 . Thus, it follows from (A) that
𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸[𝐶
R
𝐸, 𝒰] = ∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸, 𝑉𝑗)
= ∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸, 𝑉𝑗) = 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R𝐸, 𝒰]. (ͣb)
Similarly, we also have that:
𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸[𝐶
R∗
𝐸 , 𝒰] = 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R
∗
𝐸 , 𝒰]. (ͣc)
Now, (ͣa), (ͣb), and (ͣc) jointly imply that
𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R𝐸, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R
∗
𝐸 , 𝒰],
where equality holds if and only if𝐶R𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶R
∗
𝐸 (𝑈𝑖) for any𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰. In a similar way
to the proof of Proposition ͠, on the other hand, we can prove that the following two
propositions are equivalent to each other: (i) 𝐶R𝐸(𝑈𝑖) = 𝐶R
∗
𝐸 (𝑈𝑖) for any 𝑈𝑖 ∈ 𝒰; (ii)
𝐶R𝐸 = 𝐶R
∗
𝐸 . Finally, we have that
𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R𝐸, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝐸[𝐶R
∗
𝐸 , 𝒰],
where equality holds if and only if 𝐶R𝐸 = 𝐶R
∗
𝐸 . Done.
A proof of Proposition ͤ: We can prove Proposition ͤ in the very similar way to
the proof of Proposition ͣ. Let ℝℰ be a set of updating rules on ℰ for a chance-free
credence function 𝐶 . All members of ℝℰ correct 𝐶 to a chance-fed function such that
𝐶R𝐸𝑖 satisϐies the Principal Principle and assigns 𝐸𝑖 to ͟, for any Rℰ ∈ ℝℰ and 𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ.
Let Rℰ be the Conditionalizing-ϐirst Rule on ℰ for 𝐶 such that 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 = 𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝐶𝐻 for any
𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ. Lastly, let R∗ℰ be an updating rule in ℝℰ. Then, Immodesty implies that: for
any𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ,
𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸𝑖 [𝐶
R
𝐸𝑖, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸𝑖 [𝐶
R∗
𝐸𝑖, 𝒰], (ͤa)
where equality holds if and only if 𝐶R𝐸𝑖 (𝑈𝑗) = 𝐶
R∗
𝐸𝑖(𝑈𝑗) for any 𝑈𝑗 ∈ 𝒰, which is
equivalent to𝐶R𝐸𝑖 = 𝐶
R∗
𝐸𝑖 . Note that𝐶
R
𝐸𝑖 = 𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝐶𝐻 for any𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ. Similar to (ͣb) and
͡͠
(ͣc), it follows from (A) that, for any𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ,
𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸𝑖 [𝐶
R
𝐸𝑖, 𝒰] = ∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝐶𝐻(𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸𝑖, 𝑉𝑗)
= ∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶𝐸𝑖(𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸, 𝑉𝑗)
= ∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑗|𝐸𝑖)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸, 𝑉𝑗). (ͤb)
By the same token, it also holds that: for any𝐸𝑖 ∈ ℰ,
𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸𝑖 [𝐶
R∗
𝐸𝑖, 𝒰] = ∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑗|𝐸𝑖)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R
∗
𝐸 , 𝑉𝑗). (ͤc)
Then, (ͤb) and the relevant deϐinitions imply that:
𝐸𝐼𝐶[Rℰ, 𝒰] = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ,𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶(𝐸𝑖𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸𝑖, 𝑉𝑗)
= ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
⎛⎜
⎝
∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶(𝐸𝑖𝑈𝑗)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸𝑖, 𝑉𝑗)⎞⎟
⎠
= ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐸𝑖)⎛⎜
⎝
∑
𝑈𝑗∈𝒰
𝐶(𝑈𝑗|𝐸𝑖)ℑ𝒰(𝐶R𝐸𝑖, 𝑉𝑗)⎞⎟
⎠
= ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐸𝑖)𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸𝑖 [𝐶
R
𝐸𝑖, 𝒰]. (ͤd)
Similarly, it follows from (ͤc) and the relevant deϐinition that:
𝐸𝐼𝐶[R∗ℰ, 𝒰] = ∑
𝐸𝑖∈ℰ
𝐶(𝐸𝑖)𝐸𝐼𝐶R𝐸𝑖 [𝐶
R∗
𝐸𝑖, 𝒰]. (ͤe)
Now, (ͤa), (ͤd), and (ͤe) imply that:
𝐸𝐼𝐶[Rℰ, 𝒰] ≤ 𝐸𝐼𝐶[R∗ℰ, 𝒰],
where equality holds if and only if Rℰ = R∗ℰ. Done.
͡͡
Correcting chance-free credences in accordance with the New Principle
As mentioned in Section ͠, the original version of the Principal Principle suffers from
the Big Bad Bug—however, the New Principle does not. That said, my discussions
go through even if we accept the New Principle rather than the original version. In
particular, we can derive the new versions of ACR͞ and ACR+, which require us to
correct in accordance with the New Principle. Let𝐶 and𝐶𝐸 be chance-free credence
functions, and 𝐶𝐶𝐻 and 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻 be chance-fed credence functions that are updated
from 𝐶 and 𝐶𝐸 , respectively, in accordance with the New Principle. Then, we can
formulate such versions, as follows:
New ACR͞: 𝐶𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝑈𝑖), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
New ACR+: 𝐶𝐸,𝐶𝐻(𝐴) = ∑𝑈𝑖∈𝒰𝐶𝐸(𝑈𝑖)𝑐ℎ𝑖(𝐴|𝐸𝑈𝑖), for any𝐴 ⊆ 𝒲.
Note that these versions follow, in a similar way to ACR͞ and ACR+, from GAC and the
New Principle. In particular, we can derive these versions by replacing the uncondi-
tional chance function 𝑐ℎ𝑖(⋅) in ACR͞ and ACR+ with the conditional chance function
𝑐ℎ𝑖(⋅|𝑈𝑖). In a similar way, moreover, the Propositions corresponding to Propositions
͟-ͤ also follow fromNew ACR͞ and New ACR+. Therefore, we can say that my discus-
sions do not depend on which version of the Principal Principle we accept.
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Hájek, Alan (͟͠͞͠). Is Strict Coherence Coherent? Dialectica ͤͤ (͡):͢͟͟-͢͢͠.
Hall, Ned (ͧͧ͟͢). Correcting the guide to objective chance. Mind ͟͞͡ (͢͟͠):ͣͣ͞-ͣͦ͟.
Hall, Ned (͢͠͞͞). Two mistakes about credence and chance. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy ͦ͠ (͟):ͧ͡ – ͟͟͟.
͢͡
Ismael, Jenann (ͦ͠͞͞). Raid! Dissolving the big, bad bug. Noûs ͢͠ (͠):ͧ͠͠–ͥ͡͞.
Jeffrey, Richard (͢͠͞͞). Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge University
Press.
Joyce, James (ͧ͠͞͞). Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology
of Partial Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief.
Synthese. pp. ͤ͠͡-ͧͥ͠.
Lange, Marc (͠͞͞͞). Is Jeffrey conditionalization defective by virtue of being non-
commutative? Remarkson the samenessof sensory experiences. Synthese͟͠͡ (͡):ͧ͡͡
- ͢͞͡.
Leitgeb, Hannes & Pettigrew, Richard (͟͠͞͞). An Objective Justiϐication of Bayesian-
ism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science ͥͥ (͠):ͤ͠͡-
ͥ͠͠.
Lewis, David (ͧͦ͟͞). A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance. In Richard C. Jeffrey
(ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press. pp.
ͦ͡–͟͡͠.
Lewis, David (ͧͧ͟͢). Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind ͟͞͡ (͢͟͠):ͥ͢͡-ͧ͢͞.
Meacham, Christopher J. G. (ͤ͟͠͞). Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Con-
ditionalization. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy ͡:͢͢͢-ͧ͢͠.
Pettigrew, Richard (͟͠͞͡). What Chance-Credence Norms Should Not Be. Noûs ͥ͢
(͡):ͥͥ͟-ͧͤ͟.
Pettigrew, Richard (ͤ͟͠͞a). Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford University
Press UK.
Pettigrew, Richard (ͤ͟͠͞b). Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference. Philos-
ophy and Phenomenological Research ͧ͠ (͟):ͣ͡-ͣͧ.
Roberts, John. (͟͠͞͞). UnderminingUndermined: WhyHumeanSupervenienceNever
Needed toBeDebugged (Even If It’s aNecessary Truth). Philosophy of Science ͤͦ, Sͧͦ–
Sͦ͟͞.
Thau, Michael (ͧͧ͟͢). Undermining and admissibility. Mind ͟͞͡ (͢͟͠):ͧ͢͟-ͣ͢͞.
Wagner, Carl G. (͠͞͞͡). Commuting probability revisions: The uniformity rule. Erken-
ntnis ͣͧ (͡):ͧ͢͡-ͤ͢͡.
ͣ͡
